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We show that, even under incomplete markets, the equilibrium manifold identifies individual
demands everywhere in their domains. For this, we assume conditions of smoothness, interi-
ority and regularity, and avoid observational requirements at the individual level. It is crucial
that there be date-zero consumption. As a by-product, we develop some duality theory under
incomplete markets.
The transfer paradox, first pointed out by Leontief (1936), and generalized by Donsimoni and
Polemarchakis (1994), illustrates the importance of identifying the fundamentals of an economy
from observable data. Under the hypothesis of general equilibrium, the aggregate demand function
cannot be assumed to be observed: at equilibrium prices aggregate demand is, by definition, equal
to aggregate endowment. Demand, either individual or aggregate, cannot be observed for out-of-
equilibrium prices. One can observe, however, equilibrium prices and individual incomes. In this
paper we address the problem of identifying individual preferences from the equilibrium manifold of
a dynamic economy with financial markets (even when the latter are incomplete).
For the case of complete markets, positive results have been obtained by Balasko [1999], Chiappori
et al [2000] and [2004], and Matzkin [2003]. Balasko’s result has been criticized for making very
strong observational assumptions: that one can observe equilibrium prices in situations in which
∗This work was mainly carried while the first author was at Banco de la República, Colombia. We thank Herakles
Polemarchakis, John Geanakoplos and seminar participants at Banco de la República, the 2004 North American
Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, the 2004 Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society and
University of Connecticut for their comments.
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endowment is zero for all individuals but one. Under additional assumptions, Chiappori et al obtain
local identification of individual demands using a constructive argument. Matzkin determines the
largest class of fundamentals for which identification is possible. Her argument, however, is not
constructive.
The case of incomplete markets is more cumbersome. Kubler et al [2000] and [2002] use the
implicit function theorem to identify the aggregate demand function from the equilibrium manifold
(hence they obtain a local identification of the aggregate demand function). They proceed to identify
individual demands (locally) from the aggregate demand and then use Geanakoplos and Polemar-
chakis [1990] to identify preferences from individual demand functions. Therefore, they are able to
obtain local identification of individual preferences when asset markets are incomplete.
When we have numeraire assets, we identify individual demands globally. For general real assets
structures, we conjecture that our results hold generically in the space prices and endowments.
We extend Balasko’s idea on how to recover the aggregate demand function from the equilibrium
manifold to the case of (possibly incomplete) asset markets, hence we avoid using the implicit
function theorem. We then use a slightly diﬀerent argument from Kubler et al.’s to identify individual
demands from the aggregate demand function and we also avoid using Balasko’s strong observational
assumption pointed out before.
As a by-product, we develop some basic duality theory for incomplete markets.
1 Testability, identification and recoverability
Let F and X be nonempty sets. A model is a correspondence M : F ⇒ X, in which F ∈ F is a
vector of fundamentals and x ∈ X is a vector of (exogenous and endogenous) variables. A data set
is D ⊆ X.
A modelM is falsifiable if
(∃D ⊆ X) (∀F ∈ F) : D ∩ (X\M (F )) 6= ∅
A data set is D ⊆ P (X) \ {∅}. Data set D is rationalizable if
(∃F ∈ F) : D ⊆M (F )
A test T of a model is a proposition such that
D is rationalizable =⇒ T is true
and T is strongest if
T is true =⇒ D is rationalizable
That is, a model is falsifiable if one can reject the hypothesis that a data set can be explained
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by the model and some fundamentals: there exist nonrationalizable tests. A test is a statement
which is necessary for the existence of fundamentals that are able to explain a data set, while a
test is strongest if any other test is implied by it. Obviously, interesting tests are nontautological
propositions diﬀerent from ‘D is rationalizable,’ and if a tautology is a strongest test of a model,
then the model is unfalsifiable.
Definition 1 A modelM identifies fundamentals if
(F,F 0 ∈ F) ∧ (F 6= F 0) =⇒M (F ) 6=M (F 0)
Definition 2 A modelM allows recoverability of fundamentals if it identifies fundamentals and for
every F ∈ F there exists an algorithm with inputM (F ) and output F .
Notice that falsifiability (and testability) is a question of existence only, while identification (and
hence recoverability) presumes existence and studies uniqueness of fundamentals only. Identification
occurs when any diﬀerence in fundamentals suﬃces to imply diﬀerences in the relation that the
model imposes on its variables.
2 Abstract results
Fix L, S ∈ N. Define n = L (S + 1) and Sn−1++ =
©
P ∈ Rn++ : P0,1 = 1
ª
. We write any P ∈ Sn−1++ as
P = (P0, P1), where P1 = (P1, ..., PS) ∈ RLS++. Fix J ∈ N functions
¡







: rank (V (P1)) = J
where V (P1) =
£
V 1 (P1) , ..., V J (P1)
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(P · w = P · w0 ∧ P1 ¡ (w01 − w1) ∈ hV (P1)i) =⇒ f (P,w) = f (P,w0)









































DefineM1 : F1 ⇒ Sn−1++ ×RnI+ by





















(In this model, unobserved fundamentals X = F1 are functions analogous to aggregate demands,
and the model maps into sets analogous to equilibrium manifolds.)
Theorem 1 Let F ∈ F1. For each (P,w) ∈ Sn−1++ ×RnI+ , there exists
¡ bwi¢I
i=1








2. For all i, P1 ¡









































and define bwi = f i(P,wi). Then ³P, ¡ bwi¢I
i=1
´











































Corollary 1 ModelM1 identifies fundamentals.
Proof. Suppose that F,F 0 ∈ F1 andM1 (F ) =M1 (F 0). Let (P,w) ∈ Sn−1++ × RnI+ . It follows









∈ M1 (F )
(∀i ∈ {1, ..., I}) : P1 ¡





SinceM1 (F ) =M1 (F 0), it follows from the fist two conditions and the second part of theorem
1 that F 0 (P,w) =
IP
i=1
bwi and then from the third condition that F 0 (P,w) = F (P,w).




∀ (P,w) ∈ Sn−1++ ×RL++
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which is a nonempty- and single-valued correspondence. (In this model, unobserved fundamentals
X = F2 are analogous to profiles of individual demands, and the model maps into their aggregate.)





















Fix i ∈ {1, ..., I} and let ϕi : Sn−1++ × Rn+ −→ Rn+, φi : Sn−1++ −→ Rn+ and eφi : Sn−1++ −→ Rn+ be
defined by
ϕi (P,w) = F (P, (1,1, ..., w, ..., 1))
where w occupies the ith position on its vector,









∀ (P,w) ∈ Sn−1++ ×Rn+
¢
: f i (P,w) = ϕi (P,w) + φi (P )¡
∀ (P,w) ∈ Sn−1++ ×Rn+
¢
: ef i (P,w) = ϕi (P,w) + eφi (P )
Since f i, ef i ∈ f0, it follows that for every (s, l) , (s0, l0) ∈ ({0, ..., S} × {1, ..., L}) \ {(0, 1)}, every-
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³ ef is,l − wis,l´ ∂ ef is0,l0∂wi0,1









































































































































































Moreover, since f i ∈ f0, for some w ∈ Rn+, s, s0 ∈ {1, ..., S} and l, l0 ∈ {1, ..., L}, matrix
∆(l,s),(l0,s0) (w) is invertible, which gives φ
i
s,l (P ) = eφis,l (P ) and φis0,l0 (P ) = eφis0,l0 (P ). For every
other (l00, s00) ∈ ({1, ..., L} × {0, ..., S}) \ {(0, 1)},










































= eφil00,s00 (P )
where we have assumed, without loss of generality, that
∂2ϕis,l
∂(wi0,1)
2 6= 0. Finally, it follows from Walras’
law that φi0,1 (P ) = eφi0,1 (P ) .










3 The Incomplete Markets Model
Consider the canonical, two period, multigood, incomplete markets model with financial assets.
There are S + 1 states of nature, s = 0, ..., S,2 I individuals, i = 1, ..., I, and L > 2 commodities
available in each state, l = 1, ..., L. Again, denote L(S+1) by n and define the commodity space as
Rn+.
3.1 Financial Markets
A financial asset is a contract v ∈ RS that promises delivery of an amount vs ∈ R of the numeraire
at state of nature s = 1, ..., S. Let good 1 be the numeraire and let P ∈ Rn++ denote the vector of
spot prices, where Ps = (Ps,1, .., Ps,L) ∈ RL++ and Ps,l denotes the (current value of) price payable
in state s for one unit of good l. Without loss of generality, normalize prices so that P0,1 = 1.
2 State s = 0 is used to denote date zero.
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P1,1 0 · · · 0


























v1S · · · vJS


The space of income transfers is hV (P1)i, the column span of V (P1):
hV (P1)i =
©




: t = V (P1) z
ª
In general, as P1 changes, hV (P1)i changes. By construction, however, for P1 ∈ RLS++, the
dimension of hV (P1)i is always equal to the rank of V .
Assume the following:
Condition 1 V has full column rank.
3.2 No-arbitrage equilibrium manifold
Let P ∈ Rn++ denote date-zero present value prices (see Magill and Shafer, p. 1534), where
P = (P0, ..., PS) and for every s, Ps = (Ps,1..., Ps,L), and let w ∈ Rn+ represent an endowment
of commodities.
For P ∈ Sn−1++ and w ∈ Rn+, define the budget
B(P,w;V ) =
(
x ∈ Rn+ :
SX
s=0
Ps · (xs − ws) ≤ 0 and P1 ¡ (x1 − w1) ∈ hV (P1)i
)
Future consumption x1 ∈ RLS+ is financially feasible at future prices and endowments (P1, w1) ∈
RLS++ ×RLS+ if the second condition in the definition of B(P,w;V ) is satisfied: there is a portfolio of
assets, z ∈ RJ , that delivers the transfers necessary to finance x1.3
3 If dim hV (P1)i = S, or equivalently dim hV i = S, the second condition that defines B(P,w;V ) is nonbinding.
This is the case of complete markets.
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An individual is a (utility) function u : Rn+ −→ R. Let U be the class of individuals u that
are continuous, monotone and strongly quasi-concave. Define the individual demand functional
λ(•;V ) : Sn−1++ ×Rn+ × U → Rn+ as:
λ(P,w, u;V ) = argmax {u(x) : x ∈ B(P,w;V )}
Assume that there are I ∈ N individuals. Define the aggregate demand functional, Λ(•;V ) : Sn−1++ ×










Both λ and Λ are well defined, since for (P,w) ∈ Sn−1++ × Rn+, B(P,w;V ) is nonempty, compact
and convex, and each u ∈ U is continuous and strongly quasi-concave.







is a pair (x, P ) ∈
RnI+ × Sn−1++ such that:






































4 Identification of fundamentals under incomplete markets
Let f be the class of class of functions f : Sn−1++ ×Rn+ −→ Rn+ such that
(∃u ∈ U) ¡∀(P,w) ∈ Sn−1++ ×Rn+¢ : f(P,w) = argmax {u(x) : x ∈ B(P,w;V )}
Let F1 be the class of functions F : S
n−1
































Define the Equilibrium Manifold Correspondence M1 : F1 ⇒ Sn−1++ ×RnI+ by





















The next theorem shows that one under no-arbitrage equilibrium, the aggregate demand function
is uniquely determined from the equilibrium manifold, whenever individuals lie in the class U .
Theorem 3 The Equilibrium Manifold Correspondence identifies fundamentals.
Proof. From corollary 1, it suﬃces to observe that f ⊆f and that
(∀F ∈ F1) :M1 (F ) =M1 (F )
Remark 1 This is Balasko [1999] in incomplete markets. As in the complete markets case, one
makes no use of any topological or diﬀerential property of the equilibrium manifold (strictly speaking,
equilibrium set).
If one is willing to assume that equilibrium prices are observable for situations in which the
incomes of all individuals but one are zero, then it is straightforward that aggregate demand pins
down individual demands: for all i, f i(P,wi) = F (P, (0,0, ..., wi, ...,0)). That is, when all agents
diﬀerent from i, have no income, the fact that prices are strictly positive implies no demand for
agents diﬀerent from i, and, therefore, that aggregate demand is agent i’s individual demand. We
now show that under some additional assumptions one can pin down an individual’s demand without
pegging everybody else’s income at zero.
Let U0 be the subclass of individuals u ∈ U such that in the interior of the commodity space Rn++,
ui is diﬀerentiably strictly monotone and diﬀerentiably strongly quasiconcave, and for all x ∈ Rn++,©
x0 ∈ Rn+ : ui(x0) ≥ ui(x)
ª
⊆ Rn++.
Lemma 1 Let u ∈ U0 and define f : Sn−1++ ×Rn++ → Rn+ as:
f(P,w) = argmax
©
ui(x) : x ∈ B(P,w;V )
ª
Then, for every (P,w) ∈ Sn−1++ ×Rn++, f i(P,w) ∈ Rn++ and f i is continuously diﬀerentiable.
Proof. For the first part, it suﬃces to notice that w ∈ B (P,w;V ) and that
©
x ∈ Rn+ : ui(x) ≥ ui(w)
ª
⊆
Rn++. Diﬀerentiability follows from Duﬃe and Shafer (1985, p. 293).
Theorem 4 Let u ∈ U0 and define f : Sn−1++ ×Rn++ → Rn+ as:




∀ (P,w) ∈ Sn−1++ ×RL++
¢
(∀ (s, l) , (s0, l0) ∈ ({0, ..., S} × {1, ..., L}) \ {(0, 1)}) :
∂fs,l
∂Ps0,l0










Proof. This follows from theorems 5 and 7 in appendix 1.
Let f0 be the class of functions f : Sn−1++ ×Rn++ −→ Rn++ such that:4
1. (∃u ∈ U0) ¡
∀(P,w) ∈ Sn−1++ ×Rn+
¢



























and let F01 be the class of functions F : S
n−1



































































which is a nonempty- and single-valued correspondence.
The next theorem shows that the profile of individual demands is uniquely determined from the
aggregate demand function, whenever individuals lie in the class U0.
Theorem 5 M2 identifies fundamentals.
Proof. From lemma 1, theorem 4 and its definition, it follows that F2⊆F2. The result then
follows from theorem 2, since, by construction,
(∀F ∈ F2) :M2 (F ) =M2 (F )
4The second condition is usually referred to as Regularity. See appendix 2 for a demand system that satisfies it.
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Remark 2 Since V is of full rank by condition 1, the identification of individual assets demand is
straightforward.
4.1 Observability: Financial Markets Equilibrium Manifold
Identification results are useful when the model maps into observable data. In real life one does not
observe equilibrium date zero present value prices but, instead, one observes (financial) equilibrium
spot prices for commodities and assets.
Let q ∈ RJ be the price vector at which each assets can be bought at s = 0.
For (p, q) ∈ Rn++ ×RJ and w ∈ Rn+, let
B(p, q, w;V ) =
©




: p0 · (x0 − w0) ≤ −qz ∧ p1 ¡ (x1 − w1) = V (p1) z
ª
Definition 5 Given p1 ∈ RLS++, q ∈ RJ is a no-arbitrage price vector if
V (p1) z > 0 =⇒ q · z > 0
Let S denote the set of pairs (p, q) ∈ Sn−1++ ×RJ such that q is a no-arbitrage price vector, given
p1. Define the individual demand functional in financial markets γ (•;V ) : S×Rn+ × U → Rn+, as:
γ(p, q, w, u;V ) = argmax {u(x) : x ∈ B(p, q, w;V )}
which is well defined since B(p, q, w;V ) is nonenpty, compact (because q is a no-arbitrage price
vector, given p1) and convex, and u is continuous and strongly quasi-concave.















γ(p, q,wi, ui;V )
























is (x, z, p, q) ∈
RnI+ ×RJ × Sn−1++ ×RJ such that:






















Since V is of full column rank,
IP
i=1



































































∈ UI and V be fixed. Define the set
M = {(P, ¡wi¢I
i=1
























Proof. For this, we first show that ∀(P,w) ∈ Sn−1++ ×Rn+
B(P,w;V ) = B(p,
SX
s=1
Vs (P1) , w;V )
Let x ∈ B(P,w;V ). By definition, x ∈ Rn+,
SP
s=0
Ps · (xs − ws) ≤ 0 and P1 ¡ (x1 − w1) ∈ hV (P1)i.










Ps · (xs − ws)
≥ P0 · (x0 − w0)
Now, let x ∈ B(p,
SP
s=1











P1 ¡ (x1 − w1) = V (P1) z. That P1 ¡ (x1 − w1) ∈ hV (P1)i is immediate, whereas
SX
s=1







≤ −P0 · (x0 − w0)
14









































































































which implies that (P, (w)Ii=1) ∈M .



































Appendix 1: Duality in Incomplete Markets
Fix an individual u ∈ U0.
Define U ⊆ R as the image of Rn++ under u:
U =
©




: u (x) = µ
ª
For each (w1, µ) ∈ RLS++ × U , let D (w1, µ) ⊆ Sn−1++ be defined as follows:
D (w1, µ) =
©




: u (x) = µ and P1 ¡ (x1 − w1) ∈ hV (P1)i
ª
Proposition 2 For each (w1, µ) ∈ RLS++ × U , D (w1, µ) is diﬀeomorphic to©




: u (x) = µ and P1 ¡ (x1 − w1) ∈ hV (P1)i
ª
which is open.
Proof. Let D denote the latter set. That D (w1, µ) and D are diﬀeomorphic is straightforward.
We now show that D is open. Let P ∈ D. By definition, for some x ∈ Rn++, u (x) = µ and
P1¡ (x1 − w1) ∈ hV (P1)i, whereas using the implicit function theorem, since ∂x0 (u (x)) ∈ RL++, for
some ε > 0, Bε (x1) ⊆ RLS++ and
(∀ex1 ∈ Bε (x1)) ¡∃ex0 ∈ RL++¢ : u (ex0, ex1) = u(x)
Given that ∀ (s, l) ∈ {1, ..., S} × {1, ..., L},
lim
δ−→0





there exists δs,l > 0 such that












and consider the function h : Rn−1++ → Rn−1++ , h(P ) =
³

























































and, hence kx01 − x1k < ε. This implies that x01 ∈ Bε (x1) and, therefore, that there exists x00 ∈ RL++
such that u (x00, x01) = u (x).








)¡(x01 − w1) = ( P1P1,1 , ...
PS
PS,1
)¡(x1 − w1) ∈ hV i, and, hence,
P 0 ∈ D.
For each (w1, µ) ∈ RLS++ × U such that D (w1, µ) 6= ∅, define the Hicksian demand function
h (·;w1, µ) : D (w1, µ) −→ Rn++, as:




Ps · xs : u(x) ≥ µ and P1 ¡ (x1 − w1) ∈ hV (P1)i
)
and the expenditure function e (·;w1, µ) : D (w1, µ) −→ R as:
e (P ;w1, µ) = P · h (P ;w1, µ)
Since u ∈ U0, h (P ;w1, µ) is well defined into Rn++.
Now, for each w1 ∈ RLS++, define D (w1) ⊆ Sn−1++ ×R++ as follows:
D (w1) =
(







Ps · xs 6 m and P1 ¡ (x1 − w1) ∈ hV (P1)i
)
Proposition 3 For each w1 ∈ RLS++, D (w1) is diﬀeomorphic to(







Ps · xs 6 m and P1 ¡ (x1 − w1) ∈ hV (P1)i
)
which is nonempty and open.
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Proof. This is straightforward.
For each w1 ∈ RLS++, define the conditional individual demand function ef (·, ·;w1) : D (w1) −→
Rn++ as
ef(P,m;w1) = argmax(u(x) : SX
s=0
Ps · xs ≤ m and P1 ¡ (x1 − w1) ∈ hV (P1)i
)
If u ∈ U0, any solution to the maximization problem above lies in Rn++ and is unique. Obviously,
ef(P, SX
s=0
Ps · ws;w1) = f(P,w)
Following is the standard duality result, extended to the case of incomplete markets. It contains
three parts:
1. Given endowments w, If x∗ solves the utility maximization problem at prices and P ∈ Sn−1++ ,
then x∗ solves the expenditure minimization problem at prices P and minimum utility ui(x∗).
2. Given endowments w1 and utility µ, if x∗ solves the expenditure minimization problem at prices
P ∈ D (w1, µ), then x∗ solves the utility maximization problem at prices P and endowments
x∗.
3. Given endowments w1 and utility µ, if x∗ solves the expenditure minimization problem at
prices P ∈ D (w1, µ), then x∗ solves the conditional utility maximization problem at prices P
and income ei (P,w, µ) .That is
Proposition 4 1. For every w = (w0, w1) ∈ Rn++ and every P ∈ Sn−1++ ,
u(f(P,w)) ∈ U
P ∈ D (w1, u(f(P,w)))
and
h (P ;w1, u(f(P,w))) = f(P,w)
2. Given (w1, µ) ∈ RLS++ × U , for every P ∈ D (w1, µ),
f (P, h(P ;w1, µ)) = h(P ;w1, µ)
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3. Given (w1, µ) ∈ RLS++ × U , for every P ∈ D (w1, µ),
(P, e (P,w, µ)) ∈ D (w1)
and ef (P, e (P,w, µ) ;w1) = h(P ;w1, µ)
Proof. Part (1) is straightforward given lemma 1, since u ∈ U0: argue by contradiction and use
strict monotonicity of the utility function.
Given that u is continuous, for parts (2) and (3) it suﬃces to prove that u(h(P ;w1, µ)) = µ. For
this, suppose not: u(h(P ;w1, µ)) > µ. Define x = h(P ;w1, µ) − (ε, 0, ..., 0), where ε ∈ R++. By
construction, x1 = h1(P ;w1, µ), from where P1¡(x1 − w1) ∈ hV (P1)i, and
SP
s=0
Ps ·xs < e(P ;w1, µ),
whereas since h(P ;w1, µ) ∈ Rn++, for ε small enough x ∈ Rn+ and, by continuity, u (x) > µ, which is
a contradiction.
Proposition 5 (Shepard’s Lemma) For every (w1, µ) ∈ RLS++ × U , the function e (·;w1, µ) :
D (w1, µ) −→ R++ is diﬀerentiable and
∂P (e (P ;w1, µ)) = h (P ;w1, µ)
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of the Duality Theorem (see Mas-Colell et al, Propo-
sition 3.F.1): let
K = {x ∈ Rn+ : ui(x) ≥ µ and P1 ¡ (x1 − w1) ∈ hV (P1)i
Then, K is closed and e (P ;w1, µ) is the support function of K.
Proposition 6 For every w1 ∈ RLS++, the function ef (·, ·;w1) : D (w1) −→ Rn++ is diﬀerentiable.
Proof. This can be argued in the same way as fact 5 in Duﬃe and Shafer (1985).
Proposition 7 (Slutsky Equation in incomplete markets) . Let (P,w) ∈ Sn−1++ × Rn+ and
µ = u(f(P,w)). Then, h (·;w1, µ) : D (w1, µ) −→ Rn++ is diﬀerentiable and for all (s, l) , (s0, l0) ∈
({0, ..., S} × {1, ..., L}) \ {(0, 1)}, we have:









Proof. That h (·;w1, µ) is diﬀerentiable follows from propositions 4 and 6.




∂ efs,l (P, e (P ;w1, µ) ;w1)
∂Ps0,l0
+









∂ efs,l (P, e (P ;w1, µ) ;w1)
∂Ps0,l0
+
∂ efs,l (P, e (P ;w1, µ) ;w1)
∂m
hs0,l0(P ;w1, µ)
























, e (P ;w1, µ) =
SX
s=0




∂ efs,l (P, e (P,w, µ) ;w1)
∂Ps0,l0
+




∂ efs,l (P, e (P,w, µ) ;w1)
∂Ps0,l0







∂ efs,l (P, e (P,w, µ) ;w1)
∂m
(hs0,l0(P ;w1, µ)− ws0,l0)






















Substitution gives us the desired result.
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Appendix 2: Regularity
The regularity condition assumed here is
Condition 2 For every individual i and every P ∈ Sn−1++ , there exist w ∈ Rn+, and (s, l) , (s0, l0) ∈
















The condition is inspired by but diﬀerent from the regularity condition used by Kubler et al
(2002): first, we write the condition in terms of present value prices (i.e. no-arbitrage individual
demands); second, we do not use conditional demands or asset demands to write the regularity
condition; third, in Kubler et al the condition is written for every state of the world, so they need
at least three goods while, in theory at least, we only need one good and two states.
















, l = 0, 1, 2.
are the solutions to the problem
max
x
u0 (x) st. P · x = m
where Al, Bl and Cl are homogeneous of degree zero in P and a is homogeneous of degree 1 in




















for all P and m.
Now, suppose that there are three commodities and two states of nature so that, for some
u1 : R3+ −→ R and u2 : R3+ −→ R,
u (x0, x1, x2) = u0 (x0) + min {u1 (x1) , u2 (x2)}
(Although the function is only weakly monotone and violates diﬀerentiability, it serves the illutrative
purpose of our example.)














P · x = P · w"
P1 · (x1 − w1)
P2 · (x2 − w2)
#
∈ hV (P1)i
vs : R3++ ×R+ −→ R; vs (P,m) = max
x
us (x) st. P · x = m
Claim 1 For every P = (P0, P1, P2) and w = (w0, w1, w2)
v (P,w) = max
m0,m1,m2





m0 +m1 +m2 = P · w"
m1 − P1 · w1
m2 − P2 · w2
#
∈ hV (P1)i
Proof. This follows by construction.
Claim 2 Let m0 (P,w), m1 (P,w) and m2 (P,w) denote the solution of
max
m0,m1,ms





m0 +m1 +m2 = P · w"
m1 − P1 · w1
m2 − P2 · w2
#
∈ hV (P1)i
and let (P, ew) be such that
v1 (P1,m1 (P, ew)) = v2 (P2,m2 (P, ew))
Then, for every w0 > ew0,
∂m0
∂w0,1
(P, (w0, ew1)) = 1
Proof. Since w0 > ew0,
v1 (P1,m1 (P, (w0, ew1))) = v2 (P2,m2 (P, (w0, ew1)))
Consider a perturbation dw0,1 to w0,1. Notice that by construction of V (P1),
dm1 > 0 =⇒ dm2 < 0 =⇒ (dv1 > 0 and dv2 < 0)
whereas
dm2 > 0 =⇒ dm1 < 0 =⇒ (dv1 < 0 and dv2 > 0)
which cannot be optimal, given that vs is increasing in m.
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Now, suppose that for every P , there exists ew such that
v1 (P1,m1 (P, ew)) = v2 (P2,m2 (P, ew))
and consider only w with w0 > ew0 and w1 = ew1
Let fs,l (P,w) denote optimal demands. By the first claim, for all l,












































If Bl and Cl are zero then the system is of rank 1, the utility function is homothetic and clearly
the regularity condition does not hold. If B2 (P0)C3 (P0)−B2 (P0)C3 (P0) 6= 0 the system has rank
at least 2. Below, we prove that, for this case, the regularity condition holds.
Remark 3 Not every rank 2 system satisfies the regularity condition, but every rank 3 system of
this form does. See below.
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´´ ¯¯¯¯¯¯ 6= 0
⇔
¯¯¯¯
¯ C2(P0) C3(P0)³B2(P0) + 2C2(P0) log³ ma(P0)´´ ³B3(P0) + 2C3(P0) log³ ma(P0)´´
¯¯¯¯
¯ 6= 0
⇔ C2(P0)B3(P0)− C3(P0)B2(P0) 6= 0
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